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Abstract
This article studies the implications of consumption taxation on capital
accumulation in a one-sector endogenous growth model with …nite hori-
zons. A tax on consumption, when tax revenues are lump-sum rebated
to consumers, redistributes income between living generations and future,
still unborn, generations, and therefore depresses aggregate consumption
and raises saving, stimulating capital accumulation and economic growth.
If however the resources from taxation are used for …nancing unproduc-
tive public spending, the e¤ect of the consumption tax on the endogenous
growth rate disappears as no intergenerational redistribution of income oc-
curs. Finally, a consumption tax hike accompanied by a compensatory
reduction of public debt increases long-run economic growth and reduces
the consumption-output ratio. Our results on consumption taxation di¤er
substantially from those obtained within the endogenous growth literature.
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ations
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1. Introduction
The developments of the ”new growth theory” have stimulated the research inves-
tigation into the e¤ects of tax policies on the endogenously determined growth rate
of the economy. For example, the contributions of Barro (1990), Rebelo (1991),
Barro-Sala-i-Martin (1992), Pecorino (1993), Devereux-Love (1994), Stokey-Rebelo
(1995), Turnovsky (1996), Uhlig-Yanagawa (1996), Mendoza-Milesi Ferretti-Asea
(1997), Milesi Ferretti-Roubini (1998) and Turnovsky (2000), among others, have
recently examined this issue.1
The current policy debates on the proper tax incentives capable of stimulating
economic growth end up in several cases with the proposal of substituting to
some extent income tax with consumption tax with the aim of exempting savings
from the burden of double taxation and enhancing capital accumulation as well as
output growth; see, for example, Bradford (1986) and McClure-Zodrow (1996).2
However, according to the endogenous growth literature that has been devel-
oped so far, a tax on consumption either does not in‡uence output growth at all
or alternatively reduces it.
A consumption tax exerts no e¤ects on the self-propelling economic growth
rate when in…nite-horizon one-sector growth models with exogenous labour sup-
ply are considered.3 In such contexts this type of tax works like a lump-sum
tax. The inability of a consumption tax to a¤ect growth depends on the fact
that it does not alter the optimal decision about the allocation of present and
future consumption due to the in…nite horizon of the representative agent, as it
produces no e¤ects whatsoever on the relative price of consumption today versus
consumption tomorrow.4 Note that the growth rate of output remains constant
as the consumption tax varies, whatever the use of the tax revenues is.5
1An attempt to survey the consequences of di¤erent types of taxation within endogenous
growth models can be found in Xu (1994). For a general perspective concerning the consequences
of …scal policy on long-run growth, see the survey of Tanzi-Zee (1997).
2This proposal, which is not new but has a long tradition in the history of economic thought,
was suggested, among the early proponents, by Fisher (1937) and Kaldor (1955).
3See, for example, Barro (1990), Rebelo (1990), Barro-Sala-i-Martin (1992), and Xu (1994).
4In other terms the return on consumption is not in‡uenced by the tax, because of the
Ricardian debt-neutrality.
5The above results have also a correspondence within neoclassical growth models. In the
exogenous growth approach with inelastic leisure-labour choice, a permanent increase in the
consumption tax rate is neutral for the steady state capital intensity (determined by the modi…ed
golden rule), consumption and the short-run rate of capital accumulation, provided that revenues
2
Permanent e¤ects of consumption taxation on growth can be found, even
though not necessarily, when an endogenous labour-leisure choice is introduced
in models with in…nitely-lived consumers. In such a case, the tax distorts the
consumption-leisure decision. A consumption tax hike gives rise to substitution
and income e¤ects, and the net equilibrium consequence on leisure is obtained
by weighing the two e¤ects. Devereux-Love (1994) and Milesi Ferretti-Roubini
(1998), for example, discover that the tax reduces the balanced growth rate, be-
cause of the net increase in leisure (stemming from a substitution e¤ect greater
than the income e¤ect).6 However, Stokey-Rebelo (1995), incorporating some
simplifying assumptions, show that the growth e¤ect of consumption taxation
disappears, also when the tax revenues are not rebated to consumers, because
income and substitution e¤ects cancel themselves out leaving leisure una¤ected.
These conclusions, while being rigourously founded, are in some sense coun-
terintuitive, especially when labour supply is inelastic, because cases could exist
in which the consumption tax per se distorts the consumption-saving decision,
crowding out consumption and stimulating saving,7 when consumers are lump-
sum compensated for the expenditure tax, and therefore implying faster capital
accumulation and higher rate of output expansion.
This intuition is supported by two pieces of empirical evidence o¤ered by Lewis
(1998) and Lewis-Seidman (1998), on the one side, and Mendoza-Milesi Ferretti-
Asea (1997), on the other. In the Lewis (1998) and Lewis-Seidman (1998) papers,
it is shown by using U.S. data that a conversion of an income tax to a consumption
tax can increase aggregate saving even if the propensity to save of each consumer
is maintained constant, because of the variation in the propensity to save among
consumers. Mendoza-Milesi Ferretti-Asea (1997) …nd, by using a cross-country
panel of 18 OECD countries, that the consumption tax and the investment rate are
positively related, whereas consumption taxation is not a statistically-signi…cant
determinant of growth, most probably because outliers represent a serious problem
of the tax are distributed as lump-sum subsidies to consumers. If the revenues of the tax are
used to …nance unproductive government spending, we register only a steady-state reduction of
consumption and again no e¤ects on long-run capital intensity and capital accumulation along
the transition path (see Abel-Blanchard, 1983).
6When an endogenous labour supply is introduced in neoclassical growth models, a consump-
tion tax, if tax revenues are rebated to consumers as lump-sum transfers, reduces the long-run
capital stock and labour by the same amount in percentage terms, implying that along the
transition path the e¤ect on the growth rate of output is negative.
7Naturally we are assuming that the substitution e¤ect activated by the tax shock outweighs
the income e¤ect.
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in the growth regressions.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the consequences of the consumption
tax on capital formation and economic development through a simple one-sector
endogenous growth model based on the uncertain lifetimes approach of Blanchard
(1985).8 Labour supply is considered inelastic so as to eliminate the intratemporal
consumption-leisure distortion brought about by the consumption tax and to allow
us to focus solely on the e¤ect of the shock on the relative price of consumption
today and tomorrow.
The analysis of consumption taxation has not yet received too much attention
within setups based on …nite lives. One exception is represented by Auerbach-
Kotliko¤ (1987), where the consequences of di¤erent types of taxes are investigated
through a Samuelson-Diamond OLG neoclassical growth framework with an elas-
tic labour supply. In the simulated model they show that, despite the labor-leisure
choice distortion introduced by a non-unit price of consumption, the indirect tax
spurs investment and temporarily growth.
We discover that in the endogenous growth model with new generations con-
tinuously entering the economy, consumption taxation stimulates saving as con-
sumption is crowded out, allowing for more investment and permanently higher
output growth rates, when current tax revenues are lump-sum rebated to cur-
rently living consumers. The reason for such a result depends on the fact that
the consumption tax a¤ects aggregate saving through the intergenerational redis-
tribution of income that is carried out by the distribution of tax revenues. In
fact, a consumption tax is not neutral as a higher tax rate implies greater lump-
sum transfers distributed by the government to consumers. A redistribution of
wealth between young and older generations occurs, leading to higher aggregate
saving and capital accumulation as young people save relatively more than older
consumers.9
If, instead, the resources from taxation were used for …nancing unproductive
public spending, the net e¤ect of the consumption tax on the growth rate would
vanish, because according to this public-spending …nancing scheme, income is not
redistributed between living generations and generations that are still unborn.
8Other papers have already plugged Blanchard’s approach into endogenous growth frame-
works -see, for example, Alogoskou…s-Van der Ploeg (1990), Saint-Paul (1992), Van der Ploeg-
Alogoskou…s (1994), Bertola (1996) and Reinhart (1999).
9Therefore in our model the positive e¤ect of the consumption tax on saving and economic
growth is due to demographic heterogeneity of households, while in the Lewis (1998) and Lewis-
Seidman (1998) experiments this positive e¤ect depends on the income heterogeneity among
households.
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Finally, a consumption tax hike accompanied by a compensatory reduction of
public debt increases long-run economic growth and reduces the share of consump-
tion in national income. This experiment generates a transitional adjustment of
the economy, characterized by a moderate short-run variability of output growth
and consumption to output ratio.
2. The model
Consider a real economy populated by …nitely-lived consumers, competitive …rms
and the government. Time is continuous and agents are endowed with perfect
foresight.
The demand-side of the economy is modelled according to the overlapping-
generations model of Blanchard (1985) without an operative intergenerational
bequest motive. Individuals face uncertainty on the duration of their lives, since
they face, when they are alive, a constant probability of death ¸. In every instant
of time, a large cohort is born. The size of each cohort is normalized to one.
Population, composed of the cohorts of all ages, remains constant, since the birth
rate is assumed to equal the death rate.10 Labour is supplied inelastically and
hence normalized to one.
We assume that the instantaneous utility function of consumers is logarithmic.
The consumer born at time s maximizes the expected lifetime welfareZ 1
t
ln
»
c (s; v)e(µ+¸)(t¡v)dv (1)
subject to the individual ‡ow budget constraint
d
»
f (s; t)
dt
= [r(t) + ¸]
»
f (s; t)+
»
y (s; t)¡ »q (s; t)¡ (1 + ¿ c) »c (s; t) (2)
where
»
c (s; t),
»
f (s; t),
»
y (s; t),
»
q (s; t) denote at time t consumption, non-human
wealth, non-interest income and lump-sum taxes of a consumer born at time s · t,
respectively; r(t) denote the interest rate at time t; µ and ¿ c are the exogenous
rate of time preference and the constant consumption tax rate, respectively. Tildes
denote individual variables.
10A demographic structure based on overlapping in…nitely-lived families not altruistically
linked to older cohorts that enter the economy continuously (as in Weil, 1989) would not a¤ect
our results.
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The budget constraint (2) incorporates the hypothesis that consumers receive
an actuarially fair premium ¸
»
f (s; t) from the life insurance company and give
all their wealth to the life insurance company contingent on their death.
By integrating the budget constraint (2) forward and by imposing the transver-
sality condition precluding Ponzi games, we obtain the consumer’s intertemporal
budget constraint
Z 1
t
»
c (s; v)e¡
R v
t
[r(u)+¸]dudv =
h»
f (s; t)+
»
h (s; t)
i
(1 + ¿ c)
(3)
where
»
h (s; t) represents human wealth, i.e. the present discounted value of ex-
pected future income net of lump-sum taxes.
The …rst order conditions for the individual maximization problem yield
d
»
c (s; t)
dt
= [r(t)¡ µ] »c (s; t) (4’)
and thus from the consumer’s present value budget constraint
»
c (s; v) =
(µ + ¸)
(1 + ¿ c)
h»
f (s; t)+
»
h (s; t)
i
(4”)
Note that the introduction of a proportional tax on consumption decreases
the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, because total wealth should
be de‡ated, in order to be expressed in terms of consumption, by the price of one
unit consumption, given by (1 + ¿ c).
After having aggregated the solution of the individual maximization program
over all the cohorts,11 we obtain the Blanchard-Yaari law of motion of consump-
tion, and the dynamic equations of aggregate non-human and human wealth
:
C (t) = [r(t)¡ µ]C(t)¡ ¸(µ + ¸)
(1 + ¿ c)
F (t) (5a)
11Each aggregate variable is de…ned as
Z(t) =
Z t
¡1
»
z (s; t)¸e¸(s¡t)ds
where
»
z (s; t) indicates a generic individual variable. Therefore capital letters denote aggregate
variables of the corresponding lower-case letters with tilde.
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:F (t) = r(t)F (t) + Y (t)¡Q(t)¡ (1 + ¿ c)C(t) (5b)
:
H (t) = [r(t) + ¸]H(t)¡ Y (t) +Q(t) (5c)
Since the rate of change of aggregate consumption depends, amongst other factors,
on the level of non-human wealth, it is also a¤ected by the consumption tax rate,
which decreases one unit of wealth by
¿ c
(1 + ¿ c)
, because of the non-unit price of
consumption.12
Non-human wealth of consumers consists of physical capital and stock of gov-
ernment debt
F (t) = K(t) +B(t) (6)
where K(t) and B(t) denote the capital stock and the stock of public debt, re-
spectively.
The production side of the economy is composed of many identical competitive
…rms. Firms produce output by using the following production function
Y (t) = AK(t)®L(t)1¡®K¤(t)1¡®; 0 < ® < 1 (7)
where A is a positive constant, L(t) is labour and K¤(t) is the average capital
stock of the economy. K¤(t) represents a factor of production externality given to
the individual …rm, due to a ”learning by doing” mechanism (as in Romer, 1986).
Technology (7) guarantees the existence of an endogenously driven growth rate of
output, since it shows constant returns to scale with respect to aggregate capital
stock, i.e. the accumulating factor.
The representative …rm solves the following intertemporal optimization prob-
lem13
max
K(v);L(v)
¦(t) =
Z 1
t
h
Y (v)¡ w(v)L(v)¡ :K (v)
i
e¡
R v
t r(u)dudv (8)
subject to (7). ¦(t) represents the present discounted value of net pro…ts.
12The reason for having this e¤ect in the dynamic equation of aggregate consumption is due
to the di¤erent rates of return on human and non-human wealth. In the case of an in…nite
horizon (¸ = 0), the e¤ect of the consumption tax rate disappears from equation (5).
13For the sake of simplicity, we assume that capital does not depreciate and all capital accu-
mulation (decumulaton) occurs at a continuous rate and does not incur adjustment costs.
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The …rst order conditions for the maximum entail
r(t) = ®AK(t)®¡1L(t)1¡®K¤(t)1¡® (9a)
w(t) = (1¡ ®)AK(t)®L(t)¡®K¤(t)1¡® (9b)
Equation (9a) implies that -once the equilibrium condition on the labour mar-
ket, i.e. L(t) = 1, and the consistency requirement about K¤, i.e. K¤(t) = K(t),
are accounted for- the return on investment is constant, since we have
r(t) = ®A (9a’)
This is the key element for having endogenous growth.
Then, we have to consider the government instantaneous budget constraint
given by
Q(t) + ¿ cC(t)+
:
B (t) = G(t) + r(t)B(t) (10)
where G(t) represents government consumption. Equation (10) says that total
public outlays, government spending plus interest on public debt are …nanced
through lump-sum taxes, taxes on consumption and the issuance of new debt.
The solvency of the government is guaranteed by imposing the following transver-
sality condition
lim
v!1
B(v)e¡
R v
t r(u)du = 0 (11)
Finally, the resources constraint of the economy must be considered
Y (t) = C(t) +G(t)+
:
K (t) (12)
Equation (12) states that the full employment output must be equal to the ag-
gregate demand, given by consumption, public spending and private investment,
i.e. capital accumulation.
The full macroeconomic equilibrium for the economy is obtained by combining
the optimal conditions for consumers and …rms, together with the relevant accu-
mulation equations. For simplicity, we can divide all variables by national product
and denote them by lower-case letters. After substituting out the capital-output
ratio and the interest rate, and dropping the time index, then the model can be
expressed in compact form as
8
:
c= (®A¡ µ ¡ °)c¡ ¸(µ + ¸)
(1 + ¿ c)
(A¡1 + b) (13a)
c = 1¡ g ¡ °
A
(13b)
:
b= (®A¡ °)b+ g ¡ q ¡ ¿ cc (13c)
where ° is the growth rate of output (equal to the growth rate of capital).14
We assume that ®A > µ, i.e. the economy is considered to be dynamically
e¢cient.
Note that, when no consumption externalities due to …nite horizons and no
operative bequests hypotheses ( i.e. ¸ = 0) exist, the model reduces to the in…nite-
horizon representative-consumer economy and the consumption tax drops out of
the system (13).
3. E¤ects of consumption taxation
Our analysis will consider the macroeconomic e¤ects of the following consumption
tax experiments: i) an increase in ¿ c when tax revenues are lump-sum rebated
to consumers; ii) an increase in ¿ c when resources from consumption taxation
are used for …nancing public spending; iii) an increase in ¿ c when the revenues
collected by consumption taxation are employed to reduce public debt.
i) increase in ¿ c accompanied by a compensatory reduction in q
In the present experiment, public debt to output ratio and government expen-
diture to output ratio remain constant at level b =
a
b and g =
a
g , respectively. This
implies that q is solved residually from equation (13c).
After using equation (13b) to eliminate c and
:
c (by taking the time derivative)
from equation (13a), we obtain the following nonlinear di¤erential equation with
constant coe¢cients
:
°= ¡°2 + ­° +
·
©(A
a
b +1)¡ A(1¡
a
g)(®A¡ µ)
¸
(14)
14Equation (11) -expressed in per output terms- must also be included in the compact model
(13):
lim
v!1 b(v)e
¡ R v
t
[®A¡°(u)]du = 0 (13d)
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where ­ = A(1¡ ag) + (®A¡ µ) > 0 and © = ¸(¸+ µ)
(1 + ¿ c)
> 0.
The balanced growth solution can be obtained by setting
:
°= 0 in (14) and
solving the implied quadratic equation. There are two positive solutions for the
growth rate, given by
_
°1=
­¡
½
[A(1¡ ag)¡ (®A¡ µ)]2 + 4©(A ab +1)
¾ 1
2
2
(15a)
and
_
°2=
_
°1 +
½
[A(1¡ ag)¡ (®A¡ µ)]2 + 4©(A ab +1)
¾ 1
2
(15b)
where the overbar denotes the long-run equilibrium growth rate .
It is straightforward to show that
_
°1 is positive,
_
°1< ®A¡ µ and
_
°1<
_
°2.
Figure 1 illustrates the phase diagram for the di¤erential equation (14). There
are two stationary equilibria corresponding to roots (15a) and (15b). The sta-
tionary equilibrium
_
°1 is locally unstable, while the stationary equilibrium
_
°2 is
locally stable. The
_
°1 solution represents the unique steady-state solution as °
(namely c) is a nonpredetermined variable, i.e. °(0) is free.15 Consequently, there
are no transitional dynamics in ° (and hence in c) as in response to any shock the
output growth rate immediately jumps to its new equilibrium value.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Solution (15a) for the growth rate can be easily employed for evaluating the
consequence of the consumption tax on the growth rate. The e¤ect of an increase
in ¿ c is given by
d
_
°1
d¿ c
=
½
[A(1¡ ag)¡ (®A¡ µ)]2 + 4©(A ab +1)
¾¡ 1
2
©(A
a
b +1)
(1 + ¿ c)
> 0
An increase in the consumption tax raises the endogenous growth rate of
output unambiguously and reduces the consumption-output ratio, as
d
_
c1
d¿ c
=
¡ 1
A
d
_
°1
d¿ c
< 0.16 The economy instantaneously jumps from P to P’ in Figure
15In addition, note that
_
°2 corresponds to a negative share of consumption over income.
16It is not di¢cult to ascertain that
_
c (1 + ¿c) increases.
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1.
The motivation for such a result is to be found in the hypothesis of overlapping-
generations with new entries combined with the tax revenue distribution scheme
adopted. In this context the consumption tax is capable of permanently a¤ecting
saving behaviour. When there are …nite lives with new births, a consumption tax
a¤ects the saving-consumption decision at aggregate level. Since young people
save more than old people, a redistribution of wealth occurs among generations
through lump-sum rebates of the tax revenues, in particular between the living
generations and the still unborn generations; the current generation receives part
of the lump-sum bene…ts in the form of lower lump-sum taxes. Savings and
therefore growth are raised by the tax rate hike.17 Another way of looking at these
e¤ects is the following: the rise in consumption tax brings about a reduction of the
return on consumption at aggregate level,18 inducing people to consume less and
save relatively more, therefore leading to more capital accumulation. Hence the
intertemporal perfect arbitrage condition between investment and consumption
returns is re-established only through an increase in the growth rate.
Note that the e¤ect of consumption tax on economic growth diminishes as long
as
_
°1 asymptotically approaches the value of ®A¡µ when ¸ vanishes. The positive
enhancing e¤ect of the consumption tax over the economy’s rate of expansion
disappears in the limit case of an in…nite horizon economy (¸ = 0 and
_
°1=
®A¡ µ) -con…rming the results of Barro (1990), Rebelo (1990), Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992), and Xu (1994)- as debt-neutrality holds and the intergenerational
redistributive consequences of the tax disappear.
17This result has something in common with Bertola (1996) and Uhlig-Yanagawa (1996),
where it is shown, by using a Blanchard-type overlapping generations model and a Diamond-
Samuelson type two-overlapping generations setup respectively, that a tax on capital income
stimulates long-run growth. The driving force behind their result is identical to the one in
our analysis: a tax on capital income redistributes wealth from the old to the young and thus
stimulates savings.
18The return on aggregate consumption is given by: ° + µ +
¸(¸+ µ)(A
a
b +1)
(1 + ¿ c)A
_
c
:
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ii) increase in ¿ c accompanied by a compensatory increase in g
In this experiment the government keeps the budget in equilibrium by adjust-
ing the public expenditure to income ratio, rather than q. By substituting out the
government budget constraint for eliminating g into equation (13b), we obtain
(1 + ¿ c)c = (1¡
a
q +®A
a
b)¡ (A
a
b +1)
A
° (16)
After using equation (16) into equation (13a), the following di¤erential equa-
tion is obtained
:
°= ¡°2 + [¡ + (®A¡ µ)]° + [¸(¸+ µ)¡ (®A¡ µ)¡] (17)
where ¡ =
A(1¡ aq +®A ab)
(A
a
b +1)
> 0.
When
:
°= 0, the unique meaningful solution for the long-run growth rate to
the quadratic equation in (17) is
_
°1=
[¡ + (®A¡ µ)]¡ f[¡¡ (®A¡ µ)]2 + 4¸(¸+ µ)g 12
2
(18)
According to expression (18), when the government budget is balanced through
the endogenous adjustment of public spending to income ratio, long-run economic
growth becomes independent of the consumption tax. As the tax revenues are not
rebated in a lump-sum fashion but used for government consumption, the above-
mentioned redistribution of income among the existing younger generation and
other generations is absent and so is the e¤ect on savings as well as on output
growth. The increase in g (induced by the rise in ¿ c) fully crowds out private
consumption so as to leave capital accumulation,
_
c +
_
g and
_
c (1+¿ c) unchanged.
iii) increase in ¿ c accompanied by a compensatory adjustment of b
When the government budget is balanced through the adjustment of public
debt to output ratio, a tax rule that stabilizes government debt must be consid-
ered. We consider the following tax rule
q = "b (19)
12
where ² >0. Equation (19) satis…es the government solvency condition if " >
®A ¡ ° . We assume, without sacri…cing the generality of the results, that the
stronger condition " > ®A is satis…ed.
The dynamic system can be expressed as the following system of nonlinear
di¤erential equations
:
°= ¡°2 + ­° ¡
·
A(1¡ ag)(®A¡ µ)¡ ©(Ab+ 1)
¸
(20a)
:
b= (
¿ c
A
¡ b)° + (®A¡ ")b+ [ag ¡¿ c(1¡
a
g)] (20b)
where ­ and ©, both positive, have been de…ned before.
The determination of the equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2. Here, we plot
the
:
°= 0 schedule, which shows the public debt-ouput ratio that guarantees a
constant growth rate for each value of °.19 In Figure 2, we also plot the
:
b= 0 locus.
It consists of pairs ( °; b) that ensure that the government budget is balanced.20
19The equation of the
:
°= 0 schedule is given by
b =
1
©A
½
°2 ¡­° + [A(1¡ ag)(®A¡ µ)¡©]
¾
(20a’)
Equation (20a’) is quadratic, having a positive intercept on the vertical axis and intersecting
the horizontal axis twice, at °1 and °2. These two points of intersection are given by the
expressions (15a) and (15b) by setting
a
b= 0. The
:
°= 0 locus has a minimum at point °¤ =
­
2
.
The slope of the constant output growth locus could be either positive or negative, depending
on whether ° exceeds or falls short of °¤. Notice that, as for ° 2 (°1; °2) the corresponding b
is negative and for ° ¸ °2 the share of consumption over income is negative, the only section
of the
:
°= 0 locus that we are interested in is that corresponding to the interval [0, °1] for the
growth rate.
20The equation of the
:
b= 0 locus is
b =
¿ c° +A[
a
g (1 + ¿ c)¡ ¿ c]
A("+ ° ¡ ®A) (20b’)
This schedule has positive intercept on the vertical axis -as we can reasonably assume
a
g
(1 + ¿ c) > ¿ c- and a horizontal asymptote, given by b =
¿ c
A
. The
:
b= 0 locus is upward-sloping
if ² > A[
a
g
(1 + ¿ c)
¿ c
¡(1¡®)]. This is the case assumed, without a¤ecting the qualitative results,
in Figure 2. If otherwise ² < A[
a
g
(1 + ¿ c)
¿ c
¡ (1¡ ®)], the :b= 0 locus is negatively-sloped.
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INSERT FIGURE 2
The steady-state equilibrium is given by the intersection of the two loci at point
P. The equibrium point Q can be ruled out as it does not satisfy the stability
conditions and corresponds to a negative consumption-output ratio.
The stability of equilibrium in model (20) can be investigated as follows. By
linearizing the di¤erential equations (20a) and (20b) around the steady-state equi-
librium, we can write the dynamic system in compact matrix form as· :
°
:
b
¸
=
·
j11 j12
j21 j22
¸ ·
°¡ _°
b¡
_
b
¸
(21)
where overbar variables denote long-run values and
j11 = ¡2
_
° +­>0;21
j12 = ©A>0;
j21 =
¿ c
A
¡
_
b;
j22 = ¡("+
_
° ¡®A)<0.
In order to ensure saddle-point stability, the above Jacobian must have one
positive eigenvalue associated with the jump variable, °, and one negative eigen-
value associated with the predetermined variable, b. The determinant of the
Jacobian, equal to j J j= ¡[("+ _° ¡®A)(¡2 _° +­) + ©(¿ c ¡ A
_
b)], is nega-
tive for reasonable values of structural parameters, as the required condition for
saddle-point stability.22
The equation of the stable manifold is
° =
_
° +¥(b¡
_
b) (22)
where ¥ =
j12
´1 ¡ j11
=
´1 ¡ j22
j21
< 0 and ´1 < 0 denotes the stable eigenvalue of
the Jacobian in (21). The saddle-path, depicted in Figure 3, is negatively-sloped
in the °-b space.23
21j11 represents the slope of the linearized
:
°= 0 locus, taken with a negative sign. Therefore
j11 is positive as the meaningful section of the
:
°= 0 locus is de…ned over the interval [0, °1] for
°, where this locus slopes downward. See note 19.
22Notice that, in the neighborhoods of point Q, j11 < 0 and hence saddle-point stability is
not satis…ed.
23Notice that the saddle-path is always negatively sloped regardless the sign of j21 . In Figure
3, also the linearized
:
°= 0 locus, whose slope is –
j11
j12
, and the linearized
:
b= 0 locus, whose slope
is –
j21
j22
, have been drawn. Here the
:
b= 0 locus is assumed to be positively sloped to maintain
consistency with Figure 2. See also note 20.
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INSERT FIGURE 3
An increase in ¿ c leads to an upward shift of the whole
:
°= 0 locus and a
counter clockwise rotation of the
:
b= 0 locus in Figure 2. The equilibrium moves
from point P to point P’. This implies that higher consumption taxation increases
economic growth and reduces both consumption and public debt to income ra-
tios.24 The intuition behind these results is straightforward. The greater tax
revenues stemming from the rise in the consumption tax rate require a reduction
of public debt to keep the government budget balanced. Therefore a redistri-
bution of wealth among generations occurs, as government bonds are considered
net wealth by current generations, which decreases aggregate consumption. This
in turn stimulates national savings, spurring capital accumulation and output
growth.
The equilibrium and the associated dynamics are illustrated in Figure 3. As
a rise in ¿ c results in a steady-state increase of the growth rate and a reduc-
tion of the ratio of government debt to output, the unexpected permanent …scal
shock shifts the saddle-path upward to S’S’, leading to an instantaneous jump of
economic growth, which undershoots its new long-run equilibrium value.25 The
equilibrium moves suddenly from point P to point P0 on the new saddle-path.
At P0 a government budget surplus occurs. Soon after the shock has taken place,
the system converges monotonically to the new long-run equilibrium with a de-
cumulation of government debt, a further rise in the growth rate and a reduction
of consumption to national income ratio.
24By taking the di¤erentials of equations (20) when
:
°=
:
b= 0, we obtain the following long-run
multipliers:
d
_
°
d¿ c
= ¡ [("+
_
° ¡®A)(A
_
b +1)©=(1 + ¿ c) +A
_
c ]
j J j > 0;
d
_
b
d¿ c
=
[(A
_
b ¡¿c)(A
_
b +1)©=(1 + ¿ c) + (¡2
_
° +­)A
_
c]
j J j < 0;
where j J j< 0 has been de…ned before.
25The case of perverse-shooting seems implausible according to plausible structural parameter
values.
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4. Conclusions
In this article we have investigated the consequences of a consumption tax on the
economy’s rate of output expansion in an OLG endogenous growth setup with
new entry.
We have discovered that consumption taxation reduces aggregate consumption
and raises saving, stimulating capital accumulation and economic growth, when
consumers are lump-sum compensated for the tax. Even if this result is consis-
tent with the intuition, it is quite a new one in the literature that analyzes the
e¤ects of taxes adopting one-sector endogenous growth models. The demographic
framework and the scheme of distribution of the tax revenues represents the cru-
cial elements for obtaining such a result. In fact our demographic structure fails
to display the Ricardian debt-neutrality, so that the intertemporal pattern of net
lump-sum taxes to individuals has real e¤ects.
Changes in the consumption tax necessary to …nance higher government con-
sumption to output ratio produces no e¤ects on the output growth rate as the
intergenerational restributive e¤ects seen in the case of lump-sum taxation disap-
pear.
Moreover, we can observe that a balanced-budget reduction of public debt
carried out through an increase in the consumption tax rate spurs capital accu-
mulation and growth as the change in public debt redistributes wealth among
generations, while consumption taxation is per se neutral. Under this tax exper-
iment the economy is subject to transitional dynamics. The short-run e¤ects of
consumption taxation on real growth and private consumption to national income
ratio are smaller than the long-run e¤ects.
Finally, revenue-neutral proposals that aim at reducing output taxes in favour
of expenditure taxes are successful in terms of growth stimuli, because the re-
duction of the distortions of the output tax, that works in the growth-enhancing
direction, is accompanied by a neutral change of the consumption tax.
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